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to such a contract may, however, by its terms agree
upon stipulated damages, which may be recovered
for a breach of its conditions, instead of leaving that
question open, uncertain and undetermined . . . The
sum fixed by the parties themselves in this contract
will, in the absence of fraud, be deemed to be adequate
'1 4
and the proper measure of damages by the Court.
If we assume, as the Court does in the instant case,
that in the Hahn case there was nothing unique or irreplaceable in the defendant's services for which the plaintiff
society had contracted, there could still have been difficulty
in estimating plaintiff's damages at law, except for the
presence of the liquidated damage clause, which fact might
in itself have been reason for decreeing specific performance. To that extent, the holding that the liquidated damage clause defeated specific performance could be justified.
Consequently in saying in the instant case that such clauses
do not defeat specific performance, the Court has perhaps
laid down a rule broader than necessary for the decision
of the case before it. If damages as such are an adequate
remedy for the breach of a contract, and become inadequate
in a particular case solely because of the difficulty in estimating them, it is not apparent why the removal of that
difficulty by the parties' own agreement through a liquidated damage clause should not defeat any claim to specific
performance. No such situation is presented or considered
in the case before the court here.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND REGULATION OF
SOUND AMPLIFICATION DEVICES
Saia v. People of the State of New York'
A city ordinance prohibited the use of sound amplification devices "for advertising purposes or for attracting the
attention of the passing public or... so placed and operated
that the sounds coming therefrom can be heard to the
annoyance or inconvenience of travelers upon any street
or public places or of persons in neighboring premises".
1" See, to the same effect, Bartholomae & Roesing Brewing & M. Co. v.
Modzelewski, 269 Ill. 539, 109 N. E. 1058 (1915) ; and cf. Primm v. White,
162 Mo. App. 594, 142 S. W. 802 (1912).
168 S. Ct. 1148 (1948).
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It further provided that public dissemination through such
devices of "news and matters of public concern and athletic
activities" should be excepted, provided that permission
was obtained from the Chief of Police. Defendant, a minister of the Jehovah Witnesses, had obtained a permit to
use sound equipment mounted on his car to amplify lectures on religious topics given at a fixed place in a public
park on designated Sundays. On the expiration of the permit, he applied for another one, but was refused on the
ground of complaints having been made. He thereafter
used his equipment without a permit to amplify religious
speeches in the park, was tried and convicted of violating
the ordinance. On appeal from a judgment of the New
York Court of Appeals affirming the conviction, 2 the
Supreme Court, with four justices dissenting, reversed,
holding the ordinance void on its face as violating freedom
of speech.
The brief majority opinion, by Justice Douglas, in which
the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Murphy and Rutledge
concurred, is based primarily on the absence of any standards limiting the exercise of discretion by the Chief of
Police in granting or refusing permits; Cantwell v. Connecticut,3 Lovell v. Griffin,4 and Hague v. C. I. 0.5 are regarded as controlling. Loudspeakers are termed indispensable instruments of effective public speech and the
sound truck an accepted method of political campaigning.
The ordinance would cause a political candidate's ability
to use such means of conveying his views to the public to
depend on the uncontrolled discretion of the Chief of Police,
and would be a dangerous weapon if allowed to get a
hold on our public life. Abuses must be controlled by
more narrowly drawn statutes; in the ordinance, as it
stands, the power of censorship is inherent.
The dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter, in which
Justices Reed and Burton concurred, argues that freedom
of speech does not include a right to force unwilling people
to listen, and that in such cases as the Lovell and Hague
decisions, involving utterances by speech and pen, unwilling people were forced neither to listen nor to read. But
modern sound amplifying devices afford easy opportunity
for "aural aggression" and intrusion into privacy; control
2 People

v. Saia, 297 N. Y. 659, 76 N. E. (2d) 323 (1947).

'310 U. S. 296 (1940).
'303 U1. S. 444 (1938).
5 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
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of such methods of communication of ideas is therefore
justified. There was no showing here that such control
had been arbitrarily or unfairly exercised. The case is
governed by Cox v. New Hampshire6 rather than by the
authorities relied upon by the majority.
Justice Jackson filed a sharply worded separate dissenting opinion, saying that the decision endangered the
right of free speech more than the ordinance, by "making
it ridiculous and obnoxious", and that it was a "startling
perversion" of the Constitution to say that it deprived the
States and their subdivisions of the power to regulate or
prohibit the "irresponsible introduction into public places"
of such contrivances. "Can it be," he asks, "that society
has no control of apparatus which, when put to unregulated
proselyting, propaganda and commercial uses, can render
life unbearable?" The case seemed to him in no way to
involve freedom of speech, since the defendant's right freely
to speak or to publicize his views without a prior permit
was not taken from him by the ordinance, this dealing
merely with one means of communication that could
amount to a public nuisance if abused. To the extent that
freedom of religion was involved, he stressed the curious
inconsistency between
this case and the three months old
7
McCollum decision.
The case brings out anew and in striking fashion the
sharp division of opinion on the Court as to the scope of
the right of freedom of speech and as to the extent to
which it may be controlled by the States and their subdivisions. Though agreed that the freedoms protected by
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
occupy a preferred position with reference to governmental
control and regulation, and can be curtailed only where
the "clear and present danger" test is met, the Court has
with increasing frequency and acrimony disagreed in
specific instances of attempted control. The conflicting
views expressed here by Justices Douglas and Jackson
8
parallel closely their positions in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
where in language even more vigorous than that in his
present dissent, Justice Jackson charged the Court with
having added "new stories to the temples of constitutional
law", and warned that "temples have a way of collapsing
when one story too many is added", and, as here, viewed
8

312 U. S. 569 (1941).
'People of State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,
68 S. Ct. 461 (1948).
8 319 U. S.136 (1943).
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the result as discrediting and endangering rather than protecting freedom of speech and religion.
However, it may well be that the dissent here read more
into the majority opinion than is actually there contained.
The feature of the ordinance particularly stressed by the
latter as vitiating it was the uncontrolled discretion vested
in the Police Chief to grant or refuse permits. It is far
from clear that a flat prohibition of the use of sound amplifying devices in public places would be regarded as void
on its face; certainly the majority specifically countenance
regulations of the hours or places in which such devices
may be used and of the volume of sound to which they may
be adjusted. This seems to be a long way from any holding
that obstreperous individuals and minorities have a constitutional right to intrude upon the privacy of others, or
to force their views upon those undesirous of hearing them.
The Lovell case9 seems particularly apposite. Here an
ordinance, prohibiting distribution of circulars or other
printed matter without a permit from a city official, was
termed by Chief Justice Hughes to be of a character such
that it struck at the very foundation of freedom of speech
and press by subjecting it to censorship and prior restraint
upon publication. The distinction drawn in the dissent of
Justice Frankfurter between normal expression by speech
or pen and the use of sound amplifiers to disseminate one's
views may be admitted; yet it seems to bear little relation
to the problem here, which is one of possible censorship
by arbitrary administrative action. If the ordinance, as
the majority holds, enables an administrative official, at
his pleasure and with no relation to anything except his
own caprice, to grant a permit for the use of loudspeakers
to one applicant and to refuse it to another, it contains
precisely what the Lovell case condemned.
It should perhaps be noted that in cases not involving
freedom of speech, press or religion, such permit requirements have not been viewed as conferring an arbitrary
discretion in licensing officials, but one to be exercised
fairly, in good faith, and with reference to the purposes
of the licensing statute.10 But such a construction (under
which the statute would not be void on its face, though
arbitrary exercise of the discretion conferred would be
unconstitutional in specific cases) has been viewed as too
readily facilitating the arbitrary suppression of free ex9Lovell

v. Griffin, 8upra, n. 4.
1°.See, e.g., People of the State of New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van
de Carr, 199 U. S. 552 (1905).
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pression of views to be applicable in the case of rights so
fundamental as those here involved."
Justice Jackson seems somewhat to have raised up a
straw man for the purpose of knocking it down. But if
the majority opinion can be viewed as having the effect
ascribed to it by him and as announcing a constitutional
right to force views upon unwilling listeners through devices which the listeners cannot readily escape, his criticisms have force indeed. Unreasonable production of noise
is enjoinable as a nuisance; 2 and, if it should interfere with
the reasonable use and enjoyment of a public park by the
public, would clearly constitute a public nuisance. There
are few people unfortunate enough to live and work in a
metropolitan area who have not been annoyed by the activities of sound trucks; the possibilities of the use of
airplanes equipped with sound amplification devices are
hideous to contemplate.
If the opinion of the majority is to be construed as
meaning that the right of freedom of speech makes it unconstitutional either to regulate or prohibit such means of
expression, then it would seem sound to say with Justice
Jackson that the right has been made both ridiculous and
obnoxious. It is not believed that the decision fairly construed holds any such implication. 3
The inconsistency with the McCollum case,' 4 mentioned
by Justice Jackson, is troublesome and it is possibly significant that the majority decision ignores rather than distinguishes that case. It is difficult to see why he is not
accurate in saying that there the Court held that the Constitution prohibits a State or its subdivisions from using
tax-supported property to aid religious groups to spread
11Hague
v. C. I. 0., supra, n. 5. It should be noted, however, that
In Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. 113 (1895), affirmed
in 167 U. S. 43 (1897). Justice Holmes, the later originator of the "clear
and present danger" test, in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919),
found nothing violative of freedom of speech in an ordinance prohibiting
speaking on any of the public grounds of a city without a permit from
the Mayor, upon the exercise of whose discretion no limits were in terms
Imposed.
12 Meadowbrook
Swimming Club v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146
(1938), noted in (1939) 3 Md. L. R. 240.
"8But see Editorial (1948) 34 Am. Bar Assoc. J. 589, viewing as illusory
the approval by the majority decision of statutes more "narrowly-drawn"
than the ordinance involved in the instant case. It is further stated that
within a few days after the decision, Left Wing groups in New York City,
refusing to obtain permits, placed and operated sound trucks outside reading rooms of the New York Public Library and private clubs. It is asked:
"what church, library, school, college, park, club, hospital or home will
be immune?" Certainly, however, it should be possible within the confines
of the present decision either to control or prohibit such activities.
11 Supra, n. 7.
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their faith and now holds that it compels them to allow
such property to be used for exactly the same purpose.
For even though the majority opinion be read as permitting properly drawn statutes regulating use of sound amplifying devices, it yet seems implicit in the opinion that the
defendant had a constitutional right to use a public park
for the expression of his religious views. 15 Perhaps the
answer lies in the dubious validity of the McCollum decision.
11 And

see ,Schneider v. U. S., 308 U. S. 147 (1939).

